Another situation in which consent may have been obtained coercively is when police, seeking consent to search, threaten to seek or to obtain a search warrant. A citizen may believe that obtaining a warrant is a nondiscretionary procedure and therefore may "consent" to the search. The consent in such a situation may be no more voluntary, however, than the "consent" obtained after a police officer presents a warrant. In both situations, the citizen may be responding out of a belief of inevitability rather than out of a free decision to allow the search.
Because of the potential for coercion in consent searches and because the Supreme Court has not decided whether searches conducted after these types of police threats are coercive, there is a need to examine what case law there is on this issue. More importantly, there is a need to examine whether there are alternatives to this type of search. These decisions are based on a patchwork of rationales. Some consider the words used by the officer;
22 others look at all the circumstances2 3 or find the presence of probable cause to obtain a search warrant to be determinative.2s Still others uphold a threat when it was made in response to questions by the occupants, or they simply view all threats to seek or to obtain warrants as informative.25 Many simply fail to address the possibility that a police threat is coercive. In such a situation, the citizen will permit the search because he views the search as inevitable in light of the warrant. Likewise, when a police officer threatens to seek or to obtain a warrant, the police threat may lead the citizen to believe that the search is inevitable. Because the premise underlying the consent in both cases is the inevitability of the search, both situations are inherently coercive. 33 The only difference search and look around or do you want part of us to go get a warrant and some of us to stay until they get back with a warrant?"); Kersher v. between the claim of authority in Bumper and the police threat to obtain a warrant is one of immediacy. The perception of inevitability may be the same whether the claim of lawful authority is perceived to emanate from the search warrant or from the police officer's words.
This interpretation of Bumper focuses on the consenting individual's subjective reaction to the police threat or statement, not on the statement itself. 34 Thus, Bumper does not control a situation where a person acquiesces to a search without basing consent on a police officer's claim of lawful authority. For example, where citizens, upon being served with search warrants, have told officials that they need not read or show them the warrant and that they are free to search, courts have upheld the subsequent searches based on consent. 35 The rationale is that the particular individual was not coerced by the policeman's warrant.
Because the key in Bumper is the individual's subjective reaction to the police statements, a court addressing a situation in which police threatened to seek a warrant should examine the individual's subjective reaction to the threat before it finds consent. While it is true that some individuals are able to consent freely after such threats, not all do. Alternatives to the majority approach of finding valid consent must be developed to deal with those cases in which individuals are coerced by threats to seek a warrant.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In fashioning these alternatives, care must be taken to avoid the inconsistency and the confusion which have plagued fourth amendment analysis. 
CONSENT TO SEARCH IN RESPONSE TO POLICE THREATS
In addition, the alternatives must take into account the fact that the Supreme Court recently has favored a balancing approach in fourth amendment cases. 37 Because of the rather drastic results of the exclusionary rule,s8 this balance often favors traditional law enforcement. 3 9 Therefore, in line with these concerns, the following alternatives supply added protection to the citizens granting consent without significantly interfering with traditional law enforcement functions.
The Semantic Distinction Approach. An approach suggested by at least one court is to look at the actual words spoken by the police officer to determine whether coercion is present. 40 For example, if an officer says he will "get" a warrant rather than "apply for" a warrant, he may give the citizen the impression that the issuance of a warrant is a nondiscretionary process. 4 The citizen's consent in such a case is given in response to an implicit claim of authority. The situation resembles cases where consent was vitiated by untruthful statements by police 4 2 because the police officer's failure to communicate that the warrant process is discretionary deceives the citizen. Judge Newman of the Second Circuit best stated the rationale of the semantic distinction approach:
[W]ords spoken in the process of obtaining consent to waiver of a constitutional right ought to be chosen with care. The officers are not proceeding in haste to make a split second decision of their authority to apprehend a fleeing suspect. They face a situation that normally calls for a delay necessary (Harlan, J., concurring). "The course of true law pertaining to search and seizure has not-to put it mildly-run smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 3s Often the exclusion of evidence will result in an obviously guilty defendant going free even though he committed the most despicable of crimes. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,555 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Traynor has written: "Of all the two-faced problems in the law, there is none more tormenting than that posed by the exclusionary rule. to obtain a search warrant. If they are to forego the requirement, it should not be too much to ask that they take care not to confront the accused with a choice that totally obliterates the important protective function of the warrant-issuing process. 4 Because this approach emphasizes police use of a word indicating the discretionary nature of warrant proceedings, it is useful only if the citizen views the distinction between "get" and "apply for" as meaningful. Certainly, some perceptive citizens will note the distinction. For them, the semantic distinction approach makes sense because if it is presumed that if they are aware of the element of discretion, they will consent only if they truly want to do so.
However, many citizens will not recognize or will not accord any value to the difference in semantics. These citizens still will perceive the search as inevitable and likely will conclude that standing on one's constitutional rights and refusing to consent to a search would be futile and counterproductive. Just as "a reasonable person might read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous expression of demand backed by the force of law," 44 so too might "seeking" a warrant be equated with "obtaining" a warrant. Furthermore, the semantic approach creates evidentiary problems. Placing undue emphasis on the words used at the time of the search is inappropriate because later testimony is subject to fading memories. 45 Neither the citizen nor the police officer is likely to be able to recall the exact words uttered, yet it is the exact words that must be 49 In Kohn, the police gave Miranda warnings 5 0 to the suspect, and he indicated that he knew about the process of obtaining a warrant.
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The court held that these factors offset the agents' assertion that they had the "right" to get a warrant and would secure the premises, leave a guard, and return with a warrant in the morning if consent were not given.
52
The totality of the circumstances test incorporates a number of approaches. The rationale supporting inclusion of probable cause and its drawbacks are considered in detail in the next section.
61 According to Professor LaFave:
[I]t can seldom be said with confidence that a particular combination of factors will inevitably ensure a finding of either consent or no consent. This is because of (i) the inherent ambiguity of the voluntariness test and (ii) the resulting freedom of trial and appellate courts to inject their own values into the decision process while purporting to follow the dictates of the Supreme Court.
More
6 2 When consent in response to a police threat to seek or to obtain a warrant is premised on the belief that the search is inevitable, the implied claim of authority alone should invalidate consent. Determination of the voluntariness of consent based on the totality of the circumstances does not give the individual enough protection.
Examination of the Basis for the Police Threat to Seek or to Obtain a Search Warrant. Because the broad Bumper analogy hinges upon the belief that a search is inevitable, the basis for that belief is crucial. Under the basis-examination approach, consent obtained in response to a police threat is valid only when the police actually had probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a warrant.0 To obtain a search warrant, an officer must satisfy the court that probable cause exists.6 However, when an officer threatens to seek or to obtain a search warrant, the officer may or may not have probable cause at that time to support the issuance of a warrant. If the citizen consents to such a search, the consent probably is premised on the belief that the issuance of a warrant is a nondiscretionary procedure and, therefore, that the search inevitably will occur.65 Citizens, who in the absence of a threat would not consent, are likely to consent in response to such threat. If the officer making the threat had probable cause to support the issuance of a warcircumstances test, "which depends on retrospective determination of the consenting person's state of mind, is unlikely to be satisfactory however ample the facts upon which the determination is based. It will not provide convincing distinctions among cases that are decided differently." Weinreb, supra note 45, at 58. 6 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). 63 While there are a number of cases upholding consent in response to a police threat to seek or obtain a warrant where officers had probable cause, these cases ostensibly consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding, consent. Consequently, the basis-examination approach may not be a distinct test as applied by the courts. See 6 Courts have voiced a concern that police will persuade the individual that "insistence upon fourth amendment guarantees will secure for him merely a delay of the inevitable search rather than the protection against unreasonable search and seizure to which he is constitu- rant, the citizen's perception that the search is inevitable is correct, so the threat is not deceptive. He either must consent in response to the police threat to seek or to obtain a warrant or later be compelled to allow a search pursuant to a warrant. Under the basis-examination approach, if probable cause is present, then the citizen is afforded protection equal to that which would have been provided by an impartial magistrate. If, however, the police threat was made without probable cause, then the consent is invalid and the resulting evidence is excluded.* For example, one court upheld the validity of consent given in response to a police threat to obtain a warrant to search luggage which the defendant had admitted contained marijuana.
6 7 The rationale is that such threats are informative when they are based upon probable cause and when the citizen is told that he need not consent to the search.6
8 Consent is invalid, however, when police threats are made in the absence of probable cause because such threats are only coercive.6 a While the Supreme Court has recognized a need for accepting consent to search even when no probable cause to search exists, 7 ' it has not specifically decided whether probable cause is needed when the consent is given in response to a police threat to obtain a warrant.
This approach might deter officers from threatening to obtain warrants if no probable cause existed or searching if they lacked probable cause and consent was given only in response to a threat.
7 ' This positive result would protect citizens who mistakenly believe that a search is inevitable. On the other hand, this approach might lead police to threaten citizens with the possibility of obtaining a search warrant whenever the citizen refuses consent but probable cause is present. Consent in reponse to such a threat correctly would be premised on the inevitability of the search. In a sense, such threats would be informative. But the informative aspect of the threat-that the search really is inevitable-is woefully incomplete. To permit police to threaten citizens to encourage waiver of constitutional rights properly falls outside traditional law enforcement values. 72 In addition, a retrospective rather than a prospective determination of the presence of probable cause invites abuse, particularly when admissibility of evidence is dependent on the preexistence of probable cause. 7 3 The number and magnitude of the problems with the examination of basis approach make it unsatisfactory.
Prohibition of Consent Search in Response to
Police Threat to Obtain a Warrant. An approach currently not employed by any jurisdiction is to prohibit all consent searches in response to police threats to obtain a warrant. Those who support this approach agree that no one would consent to a search when he believed that evidence incriminating himself would be found 74 unless he believed that the threatened search was inevitable. The number of cases in which incriminating evidence is found 71 An officer knowing that evidence will be excluded will be deterred from threatening. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent such infringements of individual rights. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) .
72 Although " [t] he circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning," to allow police to threaten citizens comes seriously close to giving them "carte blanche to extract what they can from a suspect" and, therefore, would seem to fall outside traditional law enforcement functions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218, 225.
73 Such a procedure would bypass "the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the ... search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964 easily by police immediately after consent in response to threats to seek or to obtain a warrant 75 indicates that acquiesence to search in many cases is premised on inevitability. Because the officer cannot be certain that a warrant will issue, the citizen's acquiesence is misplaced. Protection of the individual consenting to a search in response to a police threat, it may be argued, can only be afforded effectively by eliminating this branch of the consent search exception altogether.
Unlike prohibition of consent searches, the prohibition of police threats to seek or to obtain search warrants would not interfere with traditional law enforcement functions of police.
76 Whereas the consent search comes within the ambit of traditional police investigatory techniques, 77 police threats to seek or to obtain warrants do not comport with the modern view of police professionalism. 78 Similarly, in the typical consent search situation, the citizen might have an interest in saving himself the time, aggravation, and unnecessary "embarrassment to himself and to his friends or neighbors who might be questioned as the result of suspicion." 79 This interest is not likely to be the controlling consideration in granting consent only after a police threat. If such aggravations were paramount, it would seem likely that consent, given an opportunity, would precede the threat. In the absence of policy reasons supporting the encouragement of police threats to citizens, even a mere possibility of coercion supports prohibition. By forbidding officers with probable cause from threatening citizens with the perceived inevitability of a search pursuant to a warrant, this approach has several benefits not shared by the three other alternatives already discussed. Unlike the semantic distinction approach, prohibition affords the less perceptive citizen protection identical with that of a person who perceives every semantic nuance. Prohibition eliminates the uncertainty of the caseby-case analysis resulting from a totality of the circumstances approach, and it provides prospective protection to the citizen rather than a reliance on a retrospective examination of the basis for the police threat. In the absence of a warning that would negate the potential coercive effect of the police threat, prohibition of consent search following a police threat to seek or to obtain a warrant is the best approach.
Required Warnings. Another possible alternative is to require officers to accompany all threats to seek or to obtain search warrants with a warning that consent need not be given. To minimize the possibility that the citizen would perceive that the search is inevitable, such a warning would emphasize the discretionary nature of the procedure of obtaining search warrants.
Extensive warnings would not be necessary to effectuate this protection.'a This author suggests the following warning:
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home, and if you decide to refuse, I will go to court and apply for a search warrant. You should understand that I cannot be certain that a warrant will or will not be issued. The judge will determine whether there is probable cause to believe that there is contraband or evidence of a crime within your home. The issuance of a warrant is entirely within the discretion of the judge.
In the years after Miranda, commentators have urged that warnings should be required prior to consent searches. 81 The warnings are necessary, it The Columbia note proposed the following warning: You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home, and if you decide to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you do decide to let me search, you won't be able to change your mind later on, and during the search I'll be able to look in places and take things that I couldn't even if I could get a search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer before you decide, and if you can't afford a lawyer we will get one for you and you won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws which are designed to protect you from my searching, but they are too complicated for me to explain or for you to understand, so if you think you would like to take advanis argued, because the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other."2 The Model Penal Code already requires that a warning be given prior to a consent search,83 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for decades has given such warnings before obtaining consent to search. 8 & Furthermore, one court has found that giving warnings prior to consent searches does not impair the effectiveness of the police.s8
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has restricted the situations in which Miranda-type warnings are required 8 8 "Before undertaking a search under the provisions of this Article, an officer present shall inform the individual whose consent is sought that he is under no obligation to give such consent and that anything found may be taken and used in evidence." MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-RATONMENT PROCEDURE § 240.2(2) (1975).
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §

